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'
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Plaintiff and Appellant, )
)

-vs.-

)

CIVIL NO. 7796
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)
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Defendant and Respondent.
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BRANT H. WALL,

JAY ELMER BANKS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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IN TEE SUPRE}..'JE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NOm:A D. COX, Administratrix of
the Estate of Jackson Blaine Cox,
deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

)

-"VS .-

CYRIL
•
P•

)
)
)
)
)
)

r'fl1:7Q'1'·.~Q'?.T
--'- ..... ..:..[""0
l.'JJ

Defendant and Respondent.

)
)
)
)

NO. 7796 CIVIL

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court of
the State of Utah
Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford, Judge

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arose out of a collision

bet~en

an automobile driven by the defendant and one
Jackson Blaine Cox, deceased, a pedestrian.
The collision occurred at approximately
1:30 A. M. on

Janu~

21, 1951, as defendant

was driving southerly at 35 to 40 miles per
hour (T.R. 179) on the west side of u.

s.

High~y
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91, in the city of Orem, Utah, and in the vicinity of

the City Hall and the

Cro~

Cafe (T.R. 15, Stipulated

Diagram) • At that place, the high'\JIS.y runs in e. northerly and southerly direction, and is intersected to the
south and on the east side only by Center Street (Stipulated Diagram).

It is hard surfaced and has a total
There are two

width of 96 feet from curb to curb.

sets of double lines in the center of the highway, each
set being approximately one foot in

~dth

and separated

by three or four feet, thereby forming a center

To the

~st

zone~

of the center zone there are three lanes

marked for traffic, the inside and middle lanes each

being

t~lve

feet in

~dth

and the outside lane forty-

nine feet in width and extending to the curb (Stipulated
Diagram).
The collision occurred at a point

bet,~en

the City

Hall and the Crom Cafe -which, according to the markings
of the Stipulated Diagram,

~uld

be from fifty to one
~

hundred feet north of the corner of Center Street (Stipulated Diagram).

There was no marked

cross~lk,

ex-

tended crosswalk, pedestrian tunnel, or overhead pedestrian crossing at or near the place of collision, the
nearest being eight blocks north, and there

~~s
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no

traffic control present
gr~).

The

high~y

(T.R.

139, 162, Stipulated Dia-

was straight, level, and dry, and

lights were located on the Cro'WO Cafe, Post Office,
Ci~

Hall, and the north corner of Center Street

~ich

caused the high'\\fly to be well lighted in the vicinity
(T.R. 13, 81, 51, 117, 180• 203, Stipu1e.ted Diagram).

Just prior to the collision, the decedent departed

on foot from the

Cro~

Cafe on the

~st

side of the high-

ray for his home 'Which vas located to the east, and had

proceeded across the street to .a point six or seven feet

east of the most easterly center line,

~en

he reversed

his direction and began to walk in a -westerly direction

across the
The

~~gh~y

(T.R. 12, 108, Stipulated Diagram).

evidence is in dispute as to the exact place

or the collision on the highey.

There is testin1ocy

'Which would tend to establish that it occurred in the

inside lane (lane 1), to the

~st

of the center zone

and near the line separating lanes 1 and 2 (T.R.

12,53~

54, 55 108, 109, 231, 233, Stipulated Diagram), and there
is also evidence

~ich

occurred in the middle

might tend to establish
~ne

(lane 2),

~st

th~t

of the center

zone (T.R. 255, 261, 262, 294).
Following the accident, marks

~re

it

found on the
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high"WS.y '\"wnioh -were identified as being caused by the
sv~rving

of defendant's automobile.

These marks com-

menced in lane 2, and extended'in a sharp curve to the.
southeast across lane 1 to the center z·one (T .R. 158,
Stipulated Diagram).

The body of the decedent came to

rest on the 11est side of the highve.y and south of th·e
svrerve marks, the exact location of
from the evidence.

Certain

~ch

testimo~

is not clear

would place the

location of decedent's body 50 feet north of the corner
of Center Street and on the line separating lanes 1 and
~st

2 to the
Diagram),

of the center zone (T.R. 147, Stipulated

~ile

other testimony would indicate that it

came to rest near the center of the

high~y

and at a

point close to a projected north line of Center Street

(T.R. 42, 73, 91, Stipulated Diagram).
of chrome

'~re

Two small pieces

found after the collision near the east

line of lane 2 and near the swerve marks., 'Which were
identified by one

~tness

as being from the right front

headlight of defendant's automobile (Blue X's Stipulated
DiagramJ T.R. 153).
Jackson Blaine Cox died as a result of the collis-

ion, and left surviving him his widow and three minor
children.

His 'Widow, Norma D•.C.ox, as Administratrix of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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his estate, brought this action against the defendant to
recover damages for his wrongful death.

The case "Was

tried before a jury, and the trial court directed a
verdict for defendant and against plaintiff upon the
ground

tb~t

deceased was contributorily negligent as a

matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout and
in failing to heed the approach of defendant's

oar~

and

the trial court further ruled that the Last Clear Chance
doctrine, not being available in

tP~s

case, the negligence

of deceased proximately contributed to produce his death
as a matter of law, and that therefore, as a matter of
law, the plaintiff could not recover (T.R. 334).
STATEMEl-TT OF POI1TTS-

n:.

THE TEIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTil\TG A VERDICT

AGAI~mT PLAI~~IFF

UPON THE GROUND THAT DECEASED 1mB CON-

TRIBUTORILY NEGLIGE11T AS A YLATTER OF LAY,
CEASED WAS

PF~SUMED

TO RAVE BEEN ACTING

AND SAID PRESUMPTION -WAS lTOT

II.

I~T

~TH

THAT DEDUE

CARE,

OVERCO:rt~.

TEE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTilJG A VERDICT

AGAINST PL\I:NTIFF UPON TEE GROIDID TF.AT DECEASED -WIAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A WlATTER OF LAW, IN TEAT CONTRIBUTORY

~~GLIGENCE ~

A QUESTION OF FACT FOR TEE JURY.

III.SponsoredTEE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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AGAINST TEE PLAINTIFF UPON THE GROUND THAT DECEASED
liAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LA.lf, AS

TliE QUESTION OF 1tBETHER OR NO DECEASED'S CON'l'RIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO HIS
DEATH liAS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR THE JURY.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRAN'.riiD RES.POND-

E1""!8 MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN REFUSIID
TO SUBMIT THE APPELLANT'S CASE TO THE JURY ON TEE
THEORY CF lAST CLEAR CHANCE.
ARGUMENT

I.

TEE TRIAL COURT

ERP~D

IN DIRECTING A VER~

ICT AGAI}iST PlAINTIFF UPON THE GROIDID THAT DECEASED
liAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGE1TT AS A MATTER OF IAlf,

IN THAT DECEASED 'WAS PRESUMED TO HAVE

BEE~!

ACTIID

WITH DUE CARE, AliD SAID PRESUMPTION WAS NOT OVERCOME.

The testimony fails to disclose 'With absolute
certainty Whether the deceased

~~s

walking, running

or standing at the time of the impact, or whether
he was looking and keeping a proper lookout for
defendant's automobile, or the exact location on
the highey 'Where the impact occurred.

The plain-

tiff, Norma D. Cox, testified that she only observed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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decedent commence to walk to,•rd the west side of the
high~y

from a point six or seven feet east of the center

zone, and that as she then turned to get into a parked
automobile she heard the collision (T.R. 14). Alma
Ferre, testified that he

~s

standing in front of the

Cro.n Cafe at the time of the accident, and that he
watched the decedent
bigh~y,

~lking to~rd

the

~st

side of the

but did not observe him closely for one or twn

seconds just prior to the impact (T.R. 53),
did

~tness

ent

~s

ho~ver,

he

the collision and testified that the deced-

struck

in lane 1, near the line which sep-

~le

arated lanes 1 and 2 (Stipulated Diagram, T.R. 53, 54, 55).
Another

~tness,

Ruth Ferre, testified that she saw

the decedent turn around in the

high~y

when six or seven

feet east of the center zone, and commence to walk
but did not observe

h~

~st,

again until she saw him "flying

through the air" (T.R. 108, 109).
Leon Wimber, a friend of the defendant,

~o ~s

riding in the front seat of defendant•s car at the time

or the

accident, testified that he first observed the

decedent as a "dark

s~Adow', ~ioh

stepped from the left

side of the car wmdch was "in the east of us, directly
into ojr lights, from the side" (T.R. 231).

Further

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testimony of this 'Witness 'V\fJ.s to the effect that "when
I first saw the man, he Vt.&s to the lett of the front of

the oar, and as

~

over to where he

swerved, it brought the right fender

1\6.S

at, and he hit right about where

the light and the hood come in contact there," ••• (T.R.
233); that he did not believe the oar had crossed into
lane 1 at the time of the collision (T.R. 233).
testimony,

~uld

tend to

Alma Ferre, supra,

corrobora~e

Such

the testimony of

regard to the point of impact

~th

being in lane 1, and even though this witness observed
the decedent moving westerljl, there is nothing to refute

the possibility that decedent

~s

then and there right-

fully proceeding across lane 1 toward the line separating lanes 1 and 2 (Stipulated Diagram).

Karl Smith, also a passenger in defendant's automobile, testified that he first observed the decedent
while the automobile ms swerving to the southeast (T .R.
255, 261) 1 and that the decedent -ras "standing" at a

distance of 15 feet in front and about even with the
center of the automobile which -was swerving to the southeast (T.R. 255, 262).
whether the decedent
ion.

This witness did not observe
~s

looking in any particular direct-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The defendant, Cyril P. Thompson, testified that
he first observed the deceased as a "silhouette" to the

left of the automobile (T.R. 290), and "as I stated. he
stepped into the light, When I seen him, and he

~s

stepp-

ing, and I swerved, and I glanced a'WB.y from him to see if

there

any other oars or anything coming, and I didn't

~~re

see him again." (T.R. 293).

Upon further cross examination

of defendant, he testified as

follo~:

(T.R. Z95)

"Q. Now you didn't observe whether or not he
looking at you, did you ?

~s

"·A. I didn't observe that., no. I didn't have time.
All I seen vas him step in front of us, and
that silhouette, and I s~rved."

Defendant further testified that the deoedant could have
been as far as 19 steps (57 feet) or

~re

in front of the

automobile and to the left, at the time he vas first observed (T.R. 292, 293).
In view of the

testimo~

of the foregoing witnesses,

regarding the conduct of the decedent. and the authorities
hereinafter cited, it is plaintiff's contention that the
presumption of due care, to

~ieh

the decedent was entitled

was not overcome, and to hold that the deceased was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.,
follo~ng

~s

error.

The

oases are hereinafter cited in support of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contention:

-

ii

In the recent case of Mingus v. Ollson, (Utah-1949),
201 Fao. 2nd
crossing a

495~

high~y

a pedestrian

~s

struck and killed while

in an extended cross walk.

In this case

the court ruled that the presumption of due care was overcome by

the undisputed testimony of decedent's wife that

that the decedent failed to look in any direction before
stepping into the street.

The concurring opinion states:

"Of course, if there ~s a complete absence of
evidence as to ~ether he took any precautions to
avoid the accident, then the law creates a presumption that he took reasonable precautions for his o~
safety and that he was injured in spite of such precautions.
"But here there ~s evidence from which the
jury could reasonably find that he took no precaution for his o~ safety~ and on the production
of such evidence the presum;tion disappears from
the case and the question must be determined from
the evidence. Of course the facts upon which the
presumption is based are still in evidence and if
they have a logical tendency to prove that the decedent used reason~ble care for ~~s o~ safety~ they
may be considered in determining the question."
In the case of Davis v. Denver and Rio Grande Western

Railway

Co.~

45 utah 17, 142 Fao. 705, the deceased was

hit by defendant's train and there

~re

no

~tnesses ~mo

testified regarding the facts surrounding the accident.

In this

case~

the cogrt gave the following instruction

which, on appeal,was sustained as being proper:
"There is a presumption of law that every
o~ safety when

man exercises due care for his
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in a place of danger and that deceased did so
at the tiiTe and plaoe vhen and where he met death,
so that plaintiff was not required to prove affirmatively that deceased looked and listened for the
train, the presumption being that he did so, and
burden on defendant to prove other~se, which was
bound to establish that fact by a preponderance
of the evidence."

In the recent case of Compton et al v. Ogden Union
Ry. and Depot Company, (Utah-1951), 235 Fac. 2nd 515,
the decedent ~s struck and killed by defendant's engine

in its yard.

At the conclusion of plaintiff'' s case the

trial court entered a judgment of dismissal.
of the accident, the decedent

At the time

~s ~lking ~th

a oompan-

ion who accounted for all of her movements ~ediately
prior to, and at the time she was struck.
The court in its opinion said that there is a strong
presumption based on the instinct of self-preservation
that the deceased was exercising due care for her own
safety and which may take the place of evidence sufficient to make findings on, in the absence of other evidence.

It then goes on to say:
"The presumption is applicable 'Where there

is no evidence as to care used, or perhaps Where
the evidence comes from an adverse ~tness iho
may be subject to disbelief by the jury, or Where
there is sufficient uncertainty in the evidence
&I to cast doubt on the testimony." (underlining
ours).
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In the case of Evans v. Oregon Shortline Ry.

co.,

37 Utah 431, 108 Pac. 638, an action was brought

against defendant to reoover for the
decedent

~o ~s

~ongful

death of

struck and killed by defendant's engine

While crossing defendant's tracks

~th

a team and

~gon.

The court there stated:
Hit is a presumption of law that every man exercise
due care for his 01~ safety ~en in a place of danger, and the presumption is that deceased did so ~en
he approached the crossing."
In the case of Clark et al v. Union Pacific Ry Co.,

70 utah

29~

257 Fac. 1050, the plaintiff brought an

action to recover for wrongful death resulting from a
oollEion at a

rail~y

crossing.

in the testimony regarding the

ant.

There

~s

~rnings

a conflict

given by defend-

Ho-wever. it -was established that the visibility

ms poor, and a fireman testified that he observed the

decedent some 125 feet from the crossing and anticipated

that he would stop for the train, but
do so he

~s

struck and killed.

~en

he failed to

There the court states:

"The burden of proving contributory negligence,
of course, ~• on the defendant. In absence of
evidence, there is a presumption that the deceased looked and listened, and did all that
prudence and due care required •••

"The question thus is, does the record conclusively show that deceased failed to look
and listen, and that by looking and listening
he could have discovered the approach of the
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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train in tin1e to have stopped and let it pass •"
The court considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, found the question of

contributory negligence to be for the jury and

re~Anded

for rehearing.
~he

most recent pronouncement of this point, 1Vh.ich

we have found, is set forth in the case of Tuttle v.
Pacific Intermountain Express, (Utah-1952), 242 Pao.
2nd 764.

In this case, the decadent was struck and

killed While driving in his automobile upon a public
bigh•Y•

The evidence was conflicting as to whether

or not the decedent had unexpectedly turned left in

front of defendant's truck

~ile

both

~re

traveling

south, or Whether defendant's machine crossed the center
of the

high~y

and collided with decedent's automobile

traveling north.

All of the eye witnesses testified
~

that the collision occured

~en

decedent attempted to

make au-turn in front of defendant's tractor trailer.

In the concurring opinion of Justice Crockett he says:
"The jury's verdict for the plaintiff plainly
sho~ that they did not believe the deceased
was going southward, but on the contrary their
finding •s that he was coming toward the north.
Under those circumstances, there is no evidence
~tsoever regarding his conduct just preoeeding his death. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to the presumption that he used due oare
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for his own safety, and upon that presumption
the jury could base their refusal to find him
guilty of' contributory negligence."
In the case at bar, none of the witnesses saw whether

decedent was keeping a lookout,. and certau1ly the evidance is highly controversial as to the point of impact.
The cases are numerous in other jurisdictions dealing with this point, some of the most prominent of which

are the following California decisions:
In a ~ongful death case entitled Blackmore v.
Brennan~

43 Cal. App. (2d) 280, 110 Pac. 2nd 723, Where

a motorist

~s

struck and killed in an open intersection,

the court there said:
"In the absen·ce of evidence overcoming the pre-

sumption it should prevail ••••• In other words
the j~ ~s told in effect that it must determine Whether sufficient evidence had been adduced
to overcome that presumption."

In the case of Rios v. Bennett, 88 Cal. App. {2d)
919, 200 Pao. 2nd 73, the decedent was killed at night
time while walking across the street diagonally out of
the pedestrian lane.

.A witness testified that the de-

ceased walked into the path of defendant's automobile
which the witness had seen 70 to 75 feet away.

There

the court held:
"A

pres~tion

existed that a pedestrian struck •••
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o~

safety and that in doing so he looked before
he stepped out into the street."
The oase of Duehren v. Stewart, 39 Cal. App. 201,
102 Pao. 2nd 784, is one where a pedestrian was struck
and killed while crossing a highway in a crosswalk at
an intersection at 8:00 p. M.

Evidence was introduced

that the decedent didn't turn his head or look.

The

loViier court instructed the jury regarding pres,umption of

due care, and on appeal the court stated:
"It has been repeatedly held that disputable
presumptions are evidence in a case ••• , and suoh
presumption may be controverted by other evidence •
••• It has also been repeatedly held that it is a
~estion for the jury to determine whether the presumption has been overcome by evidence offered in
contradiction thereof ••• Respondents produced no
evidence to determine ~t observations Mr. Duehren made just before he attempted to cross the
street. Appellant offered no evidence as to whether
the deceased looked prior to the time he stepped orr
the curb. Respondents -were therefore entitled to
the presumption above mentioned as their own evidence ~s reconcilable ~th it, and such presumption
remained as evidence in the case until dispelled
by evidence offered in contradiction thereof.".
In the case of Greenslitt v. Three Brothers Batik-

ing Company, 170 Ore. 345, 133 Pac. 2nd 597, the dace-

dent

~s

struck by defendant's automobile as he ran

across the highway in a diagonal direction.

There the

court helda

-15-
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"The evidenoa tending to shownegligenoe on his
part is not of suoh conclusive oharaoter as to
overcome such presumption as a matter of law. The
issue of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury."
In the case of 1f.iswell v. Shinners, 47 Cal. App.

(2d) 155, 117 Pao. 2nd 677, a pedestrian was struck
and killed while in the process of crossing a highway,
and there

'\'8S

evidence to the effect tl-t..a.t he -ms not in

a crosswalk at the time of the accident.

The court

there said:

"In urging that the direct evidence furnished
by an eye witness in this case dissipated the preflt:
sumptions established by law, respondents fail to

appreciate the limitations upon the power of the
trial court When directing a verdict as such limitations are laid do~ in Estate of Flood and Estate
of Lances, supra. Under the familiar rules there
enunciated, when there is a sho~ng on behalf of
the plaintiff of certain facts as in the instant
case, certain physical facts such as skid marks
and their relation to the point of collision and
the point at Which the driver first applied his
brakes; the speed of the automobile; the failure
of the driver to sound his horn or otherwise give
~rning; the unobstructed view of deceased on the
part of the driver for some considerable distance;
the clearness of the weather and the dryness of the
street, together ~th the presumptions relied upon;
and when on the other hand, evidence both direct
~~d circumstantial favorable to their cause, is
introduced by defendants, the latter evidence must
be eliminated from consideration by the court for
the purpose of ruling upon a motion for a directed
verdict.
"1fe therefore conclude that appellant was en-

titled
to the benefit of the presumptions here
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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them. and that it was for the jnry to determine
whether the presumptions had been overcome by evidence offered in contraction thereof, and which
last-named evidence the court was not permitted
to oonsider in ruling upon the motion for a directed verdiot.
n·cases cited by respondents in support of their

claim that the presumption is destroyed by evidence
in contradiction thereof are all oases where appeals
were taken from final judgments, in the rendition
of Which the court or ju~ was entitled to pass
upon the ~ight of all the evidence submitted and
to judge of the credibility of ~tnesses. Such
power is not within the province of a court in ruling upon motion for non-suit or directed verdict."
From the cases cited where the presumption of due
oare has been an element dealt

~th,

it should be noted

that the courts have oon.sistently allowed the question

of contributory negligence to be submitted to the jury.
In the case at bar, a reasonable man could find from

the evidence that the deceased used due care by stopping

in lane 1 to allow passage of

defendan~s

vehicle, which

he could legally and reasonably assume would continue in

the lane of traffic Which it occupied, rather than into
his lane.

Also, under many of the cases cited actual

eye-witnesses have testified regarding the conduct of

the deceased party which, if proven true, would establish
contributo~

negligence, ho~ver, even under such circum-

stances the court has entertained the presumption of due
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care and allo,red the jury to

dete~nine

Whether the evi-

denoe has been sufficient to overcome it.

In the case

at bar, the evidenoe is totally lacking as to whether the
deceased

~s

keeping a proper lookout, and it would be n

pure conjecture to say that he failed to look and see or

that he continued to 11V8.lk into the path of defendant• s
oar oblivious to the circumstances then and there existing.

It is for these reasons that

we

respectfully submit that

the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant
and against the plaintiff.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT

AGA!?-TST PLAINTIFF UP01:r THE GROUJ\il> THAT DECEASED 1fAS

CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAT, IN THAT
CONTRIBUTORY 1\JEGLIGENCE liAS .A QUESTION OF FACT FOR TEE

JURY.

In treating this point,

~

should first recognize

the respective rights of the parties at the time the
collision occurred.

57 -7-143, Utah Code Annotated,

1943, subsection (a) provides:
"Eve~

pedestrian crossing a roadway at any
point other than within a marked crosswalk or
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection
shall yield the right-of-~y to all vehicles
upon the roadway."
WithSponsored
respect
to the law a~;plioable under the
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facts in question, it is stated in Mingus v. Ollson,
201 Pac. 2nd 495, (Utah-1949), where the oourt there
said::

"The rights of pedestrians to the use of
public streets are the same as those of motorists ••• neither greater nor less."
(See also Am. Jur. Vol 5, page 615, Section
201; Blasbfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law,
Vol. 2, Sections 1241, 1242, 1243). ~
The rule applies irrespec.tive of -what portion

of the road or street the pedestrian may walk upon.
Assuming that defendant

~s

driving in lane 2 (Stipu-

lated Diagram), as the evidence
all that

~uld

tend to establish,

required of-the decedent under the eir-

~s

cumstanees 7B.s that he yield to the defendant the

right of

~y

to the lane in Which defendant was driv-

ing, provided
~s

ho~ver,

that the defendant's automobile

then so near decedent as to make a crossing of

the lane hazardous.

Certainly the decedent was not re•

quired to yield to the defendant the full 96 foot high-

way or even half of same. He could rightfully assume
that the defendant would not deviate from the lane in
which he

~s

traveling, particularly when, as from the

evidence (T.R. 2'95), there was no necessity for doing
so.

Therefore, taking the interpretation of the eviaence
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most favorable to the plaintiff, it is contended by
appellant that decedent had proceeded· westerly across
the highway into lane 1 (Stipulated Diagram), to a
point near the east line of lane 2, and was there
struck by the defendant 1 s swerving automobile.

contention is supported by the

follo~ng

This

testimony:

Alma.Ferre, the only eyewitness from a station-

ary position, testified that he saw the actual point
of impact and placed same as being in lane 1 near the
east line of lane 2 (T.R. 53, 54, 55).
of defendant's

~tnesses,

The

test~ony

Karl Smith and Leon

~mber,

referred to in point I (supra), .vrould at best present
a question of fact for the

ju~

as to the exact point

of impact and the conduct of decedent.

To further

support such a contention appellant refers to the time
element involved.

T~e

testimony most favorable to the

plaintiff would indicate that the decedent, if walking,
was proceeding at 4.1 feet per second (T.R. 122, 123).

To reach the east line of lane 2 (Stipulated Diagram),
he would have walked a total distance of approximately
24 feet from the point Where he reversed

h~s

direction,

thus requiring approximately 5.9 seconds to do so.
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test~ony

The

of the plaintiff, to the effect that she

observed the decedent turn around and start back and that
she had just turned to get into a parked automobile
~en

the collision occurred (T.R. 14),

~uld

tend to

corroborate the testimony of Mr. Ferre placing
collision in lane 1.

or

the defendant's

th~

Also, the evidence on the part

~tnesses

establishes the

follo~ng:

The decedent was first observed by the occupants

of the car to the front and left of the vehicle (T.R.
231, 233, 255, 261, 262, 293, 294); the

s~rve ~s

sharp and to the southeast (T.R. 145, 195, 233, 255., 261,
293, 294); the defendant, upon first observing the de-

cedent,

s~rved

never saw

b~

to the south east and looked away and

again (T.R. 125); neither the defendant

nor the passengers in his car saw whether the decedent
was keeping a lookout.

This testimony, in the light of

the testLmony of plaintiff's

~tnesses ~uld

definitely

present a question of fact for the jury as to the issue
of

contribute~

negligence.

Appellant further contends that the evidence regarding the location of the pieces of chrome on the
high~y

(T.R. 153), and the disputed testimony of the

witnesses as to the location of the decedent's body
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£ollo~ng

the collision, is by no means of sufficient

quality or significance to

justi~

a ruling by the trial

court of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In this connection, it must be considered that when

two opposing bodies meet at an
can be no hard and fast rule of

unkno~

p~sios

angle, there
governing the

direction a pieoe of chrome or body may fall or be deflected, and certainly suoh circumstances would not
justi~

or require that the trial court take judicial

knowledge that suoh objects would fall at a specific

point on the highway.

The

unkno~

elements regarding

the angle at whioh decedent was struck, his movements
immediately prior

t~

and at the time of impact, are

too numerous to say definitely that the metal or de-

cedent's body would fall at a given point.

It is

suggested by appellant, that it is logical to assume
that the pieces of chrome may have been flipped by
decedent's clothing, kieked and moved by people in
the highway after the collision, ricocheted from defendant's automobile, or even possibly flipped by the
wheels of the investigating officers vehicle which he
drove

do~

the center of the highway to investigate

the accident.
To Law
assume
that
theby theimpact
at a
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\~s

crossing the highway at a point where there was

no pedestrian lane, much the same as the case at bar,
when she was struck by an oncoming oar.

The court

there said:
"Ho~ver,

the evidence was in conflict as
to how plaintiff acted in relation to the surrotmding circumstances, the direction she was
going at the time, as to -where she ms hit, the
location of the Hood oar, and other matters.
1e cannot say therefore, that the conduct of
plaintiff constituted negligence as a matter of
law, particularly ~en vie~g it from the
standpoint of plaintiff and her witnesses. No
error ~s committed in denying the motion for
directed verdict."
In the case of Hunter v. ~iohaelis {Utah-1948), 198

Bac. 2nd 514, a pedestrian

~s

struck while crossing

a highvay in California in the nighttime._ Although the

Utah Supreme Court applied California substantive

law in deciding this case, it nevertheless held that
there

~s

no contributory negligence as a matter of

law for the pedestrians failure to see.
In the case of Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah
478, 189 Pao. 2nd 127,

~ere

testimony was intro-

duoed to showthat plaintiff did not look upon enter-

ing the intersection, the unanimous court held that
the question of contributory negligence vas a jury
problem.
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In the recent oase of Spackman v. Carson (Utah1950)~ 216

a truck

Fac. 2nd

~ioh

640~

Where a motorcyclist struck

pulled onto the

high~

in front of him,

the court there said:
"under the circumstances ~ are convinced
that the issues of Whether the plaintiff was
negligent in failing to keep a more diligent
lookout ahead was properly submitted to the
ju~ ••••• unless all reasonable minds must say
that a party did not use due care under a particular set of circumstances, it is a question
for the jury."

The case at bar appears to be stronger than
many of the cases cited as several inferences regard-

ing outlook or due care might reasonably have been
drawn by the jury from all the evidence.

The evi-

dence might well sustain a finding by e. jury that
the decedent did look and

see~

and as a reasonable

man, misjudged the danger or that he looked and upon

seeing defendant's car
jumped

~sterly

s~rving

easterly

to~rd him~

into lane 2 in an effort to avoid

the collision and was, notwithstanding suoh efforts,
struck and killed by defendant's machine, or that
he looked and sa.w, and

was

in lane 1 at the time he

ms struck.
The rule of law announced in the Compton case
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6f Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. (Utah

1952). 242 Fao. 2nd 764, (Supra), where the trial court
t

denied a motion for a directed verdict and allowed the ·.
issue of contributory negligence to be submitted to the
jury, notwithstanding the testimony of six eye witnesses, who's testimony, if believed, vrould establish·

contributory negligence on the part of decedent.
The S'(jpreme Court of Utah there said:
"If the evidence is such that it

~uld

be unreasonable for anyone to believe therefrom that the Tuttle car vas traveling in a
northerly direction before the collision and

not in a southerly direction as appellants
claim, then it is clear that decedent v~s
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. But if the evidence ~11 reasonably
sustain a finding that decedent was traveling
to~rd the north on the east side of the highvay and that as they ~re about to pass each
other ~ile traveling in oposite directions ,
the tractor-trailer ~nt out of control and
skidded over onto the east side of the highway and into the side of the Tuttle car. there
is no sho~ng of negligence on the part of the
decedent and there is a strong case of negligence on the part of the driver of the tractortrailer and it was proper to submit that question to the jury."

In the very recent case of Poulsen v. Manness
et al (Utah-1952). 241 Pao. 2nd 152, the plaintiff
and defendant collided in an intersection.

The

court there said:
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"The facts in this case are very similar to
those in the oase of Lowder v. Holley (Utah1951). 233 Pac. 2nd 350, recently decided by
this court. In that case, as in the instant
oase, there was evidence that the plaintiff
had stopped and looked in both directions before proceeding into the intersection and that
the driver of the other oar was going at a high
rate of speed and did not see plaintiff's oar
which ~s already in the intersection until almost upon it. In the Lowder v. Holley case, as
in the instant case, there was evidence of visual obstructions at the intersection which the
fact finder had to consider. WE TBEF.E HELD THAT

THE QUESTIONS OF 1mGtiGENCE OR CONTRIBUTORY NEG•
LIGENCE HERE QUESTIONS OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED
BY 'ffi..E FACT FINDER. THAT CASE IS CO}.YTROLLI1JG
HERE AND TEE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTIID
THESE QUESTIO~JS TO THE JURY." (Caps ours) •

In the concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Wolfe in the Poulsen case, he stated:

"IN CASES CONCERNING TRAFFIC lfHERE THE
SITUATION IS I:i\T FLUX AND DEDUCTIONS DEPEND

ON THE BASES ASSUMED, WHICH MAY BE A CHOICE
AMONG PERMUTATIONS Alto COMBINATIONS OF FACTOF..S, THE TRIAL COURT, Ul~ESS ONLY ONE COMBINATION OF FACTORS UNDER ANY REASONABLE VIEW
OF TEE EVIDENCE IS PERMISSIBLE, SHOULD NOT
FIND NEGLIGENCE AS A lvl.ATTER OF LAlf." (Caps ours).

It appears that the rule·announced in the foregoing oases has been adopted in our sister states of
California, Colorado,
Mlxico~

Idaho~

Kansas, Montana, New

Oregon, and Washington.

In the case of Lawrence v. Kansas City Power

and Light Co., et al, 167 K·an. 45, 204 Pao. 2nd
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open intersection and the trial court directed
a verdict for defendant upon the ground of oontributory negligence as a matter of law.
Court of Kansas

The Supreme

stated~

"Before a oourt can rule as a matter
of law that negligence has been established,
the evidence ahould be so clear that reasonable minds could have but one opinion~ namely:
that the party VfS.S negligent."
In the case of Martin v. Harrison, 182 Ore.

121,

18~

Pac. 2nd 534, a pedestrian

~s

killed

while crossing a high•y, not at a cross-.lk.

The

Supreme Court of Oregon there said:
"Contribute~

negligence becomes a
question of law only when from the facts
reasonable men ce~ draw only one inference
a.nd tmt inference points unerringly to
negligence of plaintiff contributing to
the injury, and in other cases the question
of contributory negligence is one o£ fact
for the jury. If a. pedestrian crossing a
street fails to look or looks straight ahead
without glancing to either side ••• he is
guil~ of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, but if he looks but does not see
approaching automobiles, or seeing one,
erroneously mdsjudges its speed or distance, or for some other reason assumes he
could avoid injury to himself the question
of contributory negligence is for the jury."
In the case of

Rios v. Bennett, (Supra), a

pedestrian was killed vhile crossing a public highway atSponsored
night.
There vs.s no evidence of whether
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the pedestrian looked before proceeding into the

highway.

The California Court statei:

"Whether a mistake in judgment by a
pedestrian when crossing a street, as to
speed and danger of approaching vehicles,
constitutes contributory negligence is a
qestion for the jury. As there 'WS.s no
evidence ~ether the pedestrian looked or
not a presumption existed that he used
ordina~ care for his o~ safety and that
in doing so he looked before he stepped
out into the street."
In the ease of

Wis~ll

v. Shinners, (Supra),

where a pedestrian was struck
high~y,

~ile

crossing a

the court there concludes:

"on the record presented to us herein,
we feel that the question ~ether decedent's
behavior and conduct, that is to say, whether
he looked and either did not see the approaching automobile, or saw it and misjudged either
its speed or distance, constituted no~tr~butory
negligence under the particular circumstances
then existing, ~s one of fact, as ~s also
the question of whether decedent's conduct
measured up to the requirements of that of a
reasonable man in complying with the aforesaid Vehicle Code provision. The question of
contributory negligence is al~ys one of fact
for the jury to decide under proper instructions,
except in those cases in Which, judged in the
light of common knowledge and experience, there
is a standard of prudence to which all persons·
similarly situated must conform. It is only
in these last-n~ed oases that failuee to adhere to that oommon standard is as a matter of
law contributory negligence. Where different
conclusions may reasonably be dra~ by different minds from the same evidence, the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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decision must be left to the triers of faot.
Therefore. under the facts and cirotunstanoes
here present. the questions of the negligence
of the defendant and the contributory negligence of the deceased. as mll a.s the import•
ant question of proximate cause, were all for
the ju~ to determine in the light of. all the
facts, circumstances and presumptions presented by the evidence.
"It should be understood that throughout
this opinion ~ have follo~d the rule applicable to eases where the appeal is taken from
a judgment following a directed verdict or nonsuit, ~ich rule requires that evidence, and
presumptions as a species of evidence, shall
be taken by the appellate tribunal in the light
most favorable to the losing party in the court
below. We are therefore expressing no opinion
as to the weight of the evidence or its truth
or falsity.n

Other cases of interest where the facts and
circumstances involved are akin to the case at bar,
and

~ere

the issue of contributory negligence or

negligence bas been held to be a question o£ ravt
are: P.rentis v. Johnston, 119 Colo. 370, 203 Pae.
2nd 733;

Stickel v. San Diego Electric Co. et al,

32 Cal. 2d 157, 195 Fac. 2nd 416; Schoen v. Schroe-

der, 53 N.M. 1, 200 Fac. 2nd 1021;

Flynn v. Helena

Cab and Bus Co., 94 Mont. 204, 21 Fac. 2nd 1105 and
Maier et al v. lfinidoka County Motor Co., et al, 61
Ida. 642, 105 Fao. 2nd 1076.
It is respectfully urged by appellant, that by
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virtue o£ the authorities hereinabove cited and the
facts and circumstances of the case at bar 1 the trial

court oommdtted error in granting defendant's motion
for a directed verdict.
III •

THE TRIAL COURT ERP.ED IN

DIRECTI~""G

A

VERDICT AGAINST PLA.I1'TIFF UPON THE GROUND THAT
DECEASED WAS COJr.rRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATI'ER
OF LAW, AS

T~~

QUESTION OF liBETHER OR NO DECEASED'S

C01TTRIBtTTORY 11EGLIGENCE 1 IF ANY, PROXD-EATELY COli-

TRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR TEE
JURY.

The issue of proximate cause has been submitted
to the jury in a great number of oases similar to
the one at bar.

Appellant contends that 1 in view

of the facts and circumstances the proximate cause

of the death of Jackson Blaine Cox was a question
of fact to be submitted to the jury and that it
was error for the trial court to crant defendant's
motion for a directed verdict.

In the case of Hess v. Robinson 1 109 Utah 60•
153 Fac. 2nd 510 1 plaintiff was traveling on an
arterial

high~y

and collided

~th

defendant who

ran a stop
sign. The trial court directed a verSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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diot that both

~re

negligent as a matter of law,

. but left to the jury the issue of' proximate cause.
The court held that evan if the plaintiff had seen
defendant's oar he

~uld

have bean un§ble to avoid

the accident by the tfme he had ascertained that
the defendant would not stop at the stop sign.
In the case of Hickock v. Skinner, 113 Utah
1, 190 Pac. 2nd

514~

the dissenting opinion, speak-

ing of the Hess v. Robinson caae, said in part:

"Although this court divided on the
question of whether or not plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, we agreed unanimously that
the question of proximate cause ~s one
for the jury."
In

tre

case of Wright v. Maynard~ ( Utah-1951).,

235 Fac. 2nd

916~

the Utah Supreme Court affirmed

the rule laid down in the case of Nikoloeropoulos
v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 Pac. 2nd

effect that it is negligence

304~

to the

as a matter of law

for a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled
public

high~y,

used by vehicles and pedestrians,

at such a rate of speed that said automobile cannot
be stopped

~thin

the distance at which the operator

of said ear is able to see objects on the

high~y
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in front of him, and in so affirming said rule, held

that the question of proximate causa

~s

a question

for the jury.

A Nevada

oase~

Styris v. Folk. 146 Pac. 2nd

782. Where a pedestrian

~s

struck by a motor ve-

hicle while crossing a street in violation of a
city ordinance stated in part:

"There is no difference in principal
as to the effect of negligence whether arising by violation of an ordinance 1 or by ordinary negligence. In either instance, whether
it is the remote or proximate cause of an
accident, is a question of fact in each particular case ••••Although, as to the former,
the negligence is presumed as a matter of law~
yet whether it is the proximate causa- of an
accident is al~ys a matter of fact •••• JNegligence per se and proximate cause are t~
separate and distinct issues. While one is
presumed as a matter of law, the other must
nevertheless~ be proved as a matter of fact.
Although appellant crossed the stre.et betW9en
intersections, in violation of an ordinance,
he cannot be held as a matter
law to have
reasonably apprehended that in so doing injury
would result. Even to a pedestrian, thus crossing, a motorist owes the duty of exercising ordina~J care.
It is true that such ordinance
gives to a motorist the right of way between
intersections. Ho'Mlver, that right is not absolute but preferential only,·and the motorist
is not absolved from his duty of exercising
ordinary care for the safety of pedestrians,
rightfully or wrongfully on the highway bet-ween such intersections. Whether the cab
driver in the instant case exercised such
care ~sa question of fact for the jury.' "

of

The case of Genola v. Barrett, 14, Cal. (2)
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217, 93 Fao. 2nd 109, involved an accident Where a
pedestrian was struck while crossing a street in
violation of an ordinance.

The Supreme Court o£

California there stated:
"Not only did the trial court hold
in the case at bar., as a matter of law,
that plaintiff ~s contributorily negligent, but that her negligence., -was,. per
se., the proximate cause of her injury.
Here., plaintiff ~s standing in the street,
according to one eye-~tness., about ten or
t-welve stB>nds • She then stepped back, at
which time the car was not 'Within an approximate eighty-foot range of vision of the
witness. lihen defendant failed to see what
was plainly visible, failed to slacken her
speed, and failed to swerve her car a few
inches to a void striking plaintiff who had
yielded the right of way, it cannot be said
that, as a matter of law, the negligence of
plaintiff ~s the proximate cause of her
injur.r•"

Additional oases which have held that the
particular case should go to the jury on the
issue of proximate cause are:
Casualty & Sure~J

850;

Co.~

164 Kan.

Baker v. Western
376~

190 Pao. 2nd

Atkins v. Morton, 164 Kan. 626, 191 Pac. 2nd

909, Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co. et al,

167 Kan. 45, 204 Pac. 2nd 752;
Arms

Co.~

117 Colo.

399~

Amos v. Remington

188 Fac. 2nd 896; Douglas

v. Hoff, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 82, 185 Fao. 2nd 607;
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Maier et al v. Minidoka County Motor Co., (Supra);

Briggs v. United Fruit & Produce
{2d) 466, 119 Pao. 2nd 687;

Inc.~

11

~sh.

Hart v. Farris, 218

Cal. 69, 21 Pao. 2nd 432 and Pollard v. Wittman,
28 Wash. (2d) 367, 183 Pao. 2nd 175.

Each of the

foregoing oases have involved aooidents on the
high~y

between vehicles or a vehicle and a ped-

estrian, and in many of such oases the facts and
circumstances have been no stronger than ip the
case at bar.
It is respectfully urged by appellant that
the evidence of the case at bar should have been
submitted to the jury on the issue.· of "proximate
cause as the jury might reasonably have found

that in view of the lack of attention of the
driver of the automobile to the road ahead and
the abundance of light in the _vicinity where the

oolasion occurred, the contributory negligence of

the decedent, if

was not a contributing

a~,

factor in the accident.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERF..ED IN GRANTI~N}

RESPO-NDENT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT .A.ND
IN REFUSING TO SUB:MIT THE APPELlANT'S CASE TO

-35-
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T?E JURY 0!! TI1E THEORY CF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.

In discussing Point IV Appellant is not unmindful
of t':1e reoent oases o£ Graham v. Johnson 1 109 Uteh 346,

166 Pao. 2nd 230; Van Wagoner et al v. Union Fao. R.
Co •• (Utah 1947); 186 Pao. md 293; Hickok v. SkinneD,

(Utah 1948), 190 Pac• 2nd 514; Holmgren v. Union Pao. R.
Co. (utah 1948), 198 Fac. 2nd 459; Anderson v. Bingham

& Garfield Ry. Co., (Utah 1950), 214 Fac. 2nd 607; and
Compton v. Ogden Union

Ry.

& Depot Co., supra, .~erein

this Court has discussed the rule of' last.clear cha.noe.

In the Graham Case, supra, this Court recognised
the dosctrine ann ounced by the American Law Institute,

Restatement of Torts, Vol. II, Ch. 17 Sec. 480 and
reaffirmed its adherence to same
supra.

i~

the Compton Case,

In the Compton Case this Court, speaking through

Justice Crockett, stated:

".A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance oould have avoided harm therefrom,
may reoover if, but only if, the defendant (a)
knew of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) realized
or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was
inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover
his peril in time to avoidthe har.mJ and (c)
thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable oare and competence his then existing
ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.
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"It will be noted these sub-paragraphs are in the
conjunctive and must all exist together before
that Section is applicable."

The Compton Case, being the most recent case in
this State, appal'ently consolidates the single points
heretofore ruled on by this Court where the doctrine

or

last clear chance was considered.

It is interesting

to note that most cases in this State have involved
railroads and automobiles or individuals, and automobile
and automobile, rather than auto-pedestrian accidents.

It is agreed that the principles should be the same

when the doctrine is invoked, but it appears to us that
in applying the principles to the facts, that in the

auto-pedestrian cases, one must bear in .mind that in
our lives today the automobile has become a dangerous
instrumentality due to its speed, increased numbers
on our highwa.ys and its maneuverability.

The automobile

has an increasing radius of operation per seeond,

depending upon its speed and other pnysical factors
while the pedestrian' s_ radius of operatio.n per second

is more or less constant and smallo

It is easy to reconcile the railroad cases if one
realizes that the railroad tra.cks are stationary;
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hence an approaching train oan only proceed in one
direction, and it is common knowledge that its operator
can avoid animpending collision only by reducing its
speed, stopping or giving a.n audible warning.

The

automobile oan avoid an impending collision by reducing
its speed, stopping, increasing its speed, turning right
or left, or by giving an audible· signal.

With these thoughts in mind and at the expense and
danger of repeating ourselves, it is found necessary
to invite the Court's attention to the evidence most
favorable to the Appellant in support of our contention
that the trlal court erred in notsubmi tting the question

of last clear chance to the jury.

It is our contention that if
found

guil~

law, which

~

b~.

Cox could be

of contributory negligence as a matter of

deny, of of fact, then and in that event,

the elements of the conscious last clear chance doctrine
as aet forth by Justice Crockett in the Compton Case,
s upra, were present; and the trial court should have
submitted the same to the jury for their determination.

At tge outset

~ invi~e

the Court's attention to

the testimony of the def'ende.nt whioh sho\\iS him to be
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a very inexperienced driver of one year's experience, and
to the fact that at the ti1ne he testified he had the

benefit of ten month's additional driving experience

~

fro.m the time of the accident (T.R. 272, 280, 281,
283, 292, 293, 295, 298, and 299).
(a)

DefendB~t

knew of the decedent's situation:

The defendant testified that his dim lights in
head of him
~

~re

illuminating the side of the road,

and he could see well enough; that the dim light

east a light out diagonally from the oar and that
you could see a lighter spot in front of you; that
is, sort of oblong; and then the light was cast off
from the direct beam in front.

He stated that vben

he first saw :Mr. Cox that he appeared as a dark

sillouette to his left as he stepped into thelight
from the side, facing -west; that he could see the full
length of him.

He could not specify as to how much

or the highway he could see, but he could see the full

height of the man; that he saw him step into the lana

he was traveling vdth his legs apart, and he walked
across in front of the car (T. R. 271, 272, 288, 290,
291, end 295).
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(b) The defendant realized or had reason to realize

that Mr. Cox ·was inattentive and therefore unlikely to
discover his peril in time to avoid the harm:

It is reasonable that the jury would have foWld

from the

testimo~

and evidence that the deceased,

after reach the .most easterly point on the highway
(T. R. 12, 53, and 108), t\Uned and walked southwesterly

towards the Ferre Car at the rate of 4.1 feet per
second, at such an angle as to place his back partially

toward the defendant's vehicle.

He proceeded southwesterly

IIF,

from the most easterly point reached on the

highw~

(T. R. 24) to the only point of impact placed on the
stipulated diagram by an eye witness, Mr. Ferre (T. Ro 54),
which appears on said diagram. on the west side of lane
number one as a pencil point close to the swere

~ks

and the pieces of chrome and identified by an rtF" o

Projecting the decedent's line of travel into lane
number two, coupled with the defendant's testimony
as to what he saw and did, makes it apparent that
a jury could reasonably find that the defendant realized

or had reason to realize that

~.

Cox was inattentive

and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time
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to avoid harm.
In the Restatment of Torts, Section 480,

supra, comment "B", it is asserted:
"Roever, it is not necessary that the circumstances
be such as to oonvinoe the def'endant that the
plaintiff is inattentive and, therefore, in danger.
It is enough that the circumstances are such as
to indicate a reasonable chance that this is the
ca.se. Even su~h a chance that the plaintiff
will not discover his peril is enough to require
the defendant to make a reasonable effort to
avoid injuring him. Therefore, if there is anything in ~e demeanor or conduct of the plaintiff
Which to a reasonable man in the defendant's position would in-dioate that the olaintiff is inattentive, and therefore, ~11 or may not discover the
approach of the train, the engineer must take such
steps as a reasonable man ~uld think necessary
under the circumstances."
.~..

Even if -we were to consider only that portion
of' the defendant's testimony to the effect that M:r.
Cox walked unhesitatingly into his lane .of travel,
this testimony in intsel f' should be sufficient to

convince a jury that the driver
decedentts inattentiveness and
peril.

iNB.S

aware of the

una~reness

of his

Under no circumstances would an alert and

attentive pedestrain commit such an act.
In the Graham Case, supra, this Court speaking

through Justice Wolfe, stated:
"Section 480 deals with the situation where
the plaintiff was inattentive but had the·
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1111

ability, had he been alert, to avoid the oncoming
danger to which the defendant was subjecting him.
But in both cases the liability of the defendant
arose because he failed to take the opportunity
which he al.one had time to avoid doing the plaintiff
harm even though the plaintiff was negligent in
getting himself in a position where he was helpless
or because he was so inattentive that he was not
alert to the approaching danger over which defendant
had control."
We submit, therefore, that the testimony demonstrates
that this element of the doctrine of last clear chance

is present.

(c) That the defendant thereafter was negligent
in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing ability to avoid harming
Mr. Cox:

It is necessary in considering this point to review
the defendant's testimony together with that of his
friendly witness, Wimber.
It appears that the position of the car in lane
number two is important.

The defendant testified

as to the position of his car therein immediately
prior to the accident.

He testified that when he

looked to his left he could just see the lefthand
line of the lane he was traveling in going along past
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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three feet down
270 and 289).

lat~en

the oar and the line (T. R.

The width of the oar was seven to

eight feet (T. R. 174).

Projecting the line of travel of 1lr. Cox into
and across lane number two, it could reasonable be found

that the point of impact could have occurred at any

•

one of three points.
1'he

first possible point of impaot ·could have

been just west of the dividing line of lane number
one and two.

Wimber,

vmo

was seated on the right side

of the front seat of the defendant's ear, testified:

that he saw the decedent step from the side into the
car's lights; that he saw a persmn move fram the east

to the west onto the lane of traffic in vhioh the
car was traveling

(T. R. 23ll

He further testified:
And will you describe that to the best of'
your ability? State ~~ere it was and--"Q•

'When I first saw the man, he was to the left
of the front of the car, and as we swerved, it
brought the right fender over to ~ere he ~~s at,
and he hit right about where the light and the hood c
come in contact there, and rolled up over the
right fender, partly on the hood, off Xk~ of the fender
down to the siae, immediately in front of mysilf
"A.

(T. R. 236)
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The second possible point of impaat oould have been
in t}"'-e center of' the lane (six feet).

Winiber again

testified:

And how far did he get into your lane of
traffic 1 the lat you saw him there?

"Q•

"A. Half' way across, approximately. (T. Ro 231)"
The third p oint of impact could have occurred approximately eleven feet to the west of' the line dividing lanes
one and two.

Wimber also testified:

"Q. Can you state when the oar was

s~rved ~dth

respect to when you saw the man?
"A.

Well., it was j-ust a split second after we

saw him., after I saw him ••••• (To R. 236)
Now how .far ahead of the car v;as he when you
first noticed him?

"Q.

"A:.

I thought at

the time perhaps 15 feet.

"Q. ·Did you feel any swerving of the car after
yot~

"A.

saw him?
I think there ·vnl s.

1

Q. Was that perving imme·diately after the time
that you first saw him, or did· the car travel a
'

little bit before you felt the swerve .of' the oar?
"A.
"~··

It could have travelled a short distance.

Now how fe.r across the width of the car did
you observe
theFunding~sternmost
portion
that
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"Q.

After you had seen him, for the first time?
·~·Jell

he hit on the right hand part of the
car (To R. 248)"

"A.

The defendant testified that Mr. Cox might have
been as far

aw~

as 59 feet and could have been farther

away than that when he first saw him (T. Ro 292 and 293)o

It would be reasonable from the testimonr to find
that the point of impact could have been at any point

along the decedents proj eeted line of travel in lane
two.

The maximum. distance Mr. Cox could have traveled,

at the rate of 4ol feet per second, into lane two
would have required approximately 2.73 seconds elapsed
time after he had entered said lane.

At 35 .miles

per hour the car would have been 139 feet away from
Mr. Cox when he entered lane two.

Adding the distrance

the deceased traveled after he appeared as a sillouette
from the left of the car a~ he entered the car 1 s light

zone and prior to his crossing into lane two, would

place the car farther away from decedent at the time he
was first seen by defendant.

At 35 miles per hour

the defendant could have stopped his car in approximately

97 feet from the point he saw the danger (38 feet

-45-
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reaction distance and 59 feet braking distance).

If the point of impact
the middle of lane
seconds for

1~.

two~

~~s

determined to be in

it would have required 1.46

Cox to reach said p oint after crossing

the line into lane

t~.

This would place the automobile

75 feet a'WB.y from him 1Vhen he entered said lane.

A

jury could a.·gain find that the deceased travelled an
additional distance from the time defendant first saw
him enter

tre

ce.r!s light zone as a sdlhouette,

thereby placing the irehicle farther

~-way

from 1,,1z-.

Cox when the danger was first perceived by the defendant.

It is again reasonable to place the point of impact
at or near the line separating lanes one and two.

If

such were the finding, then it is reasonable to infer
that the sounding of a horn be defendant. which

~

not done, would have giVBn 1v1r. Cox the opportunity to
stop and allow the car to continue its course, or to
step back out of the way of the onoo.ming vehicle.
It is evident that if the point of impact

occurred at either of the above referred to

extremes~

there was a last clear ohanoe for the defendant to
avoid the injury or death of
A~

e

~T.

Cox.
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mot.ter Of fact. the 6Videnee Strongly SUggests

that after the defendant perceived the decedent,
the defendant, through

~~citement

or otherwise,

negli.gently swerved into Mr. Cox, and that had the
defendant continued in a straight line or

sw~ed

to

the right, he would not have struck Mr. Cox.
Therefore, it is respectfully urged by Appellant that
the evidence of the case at bar should have been submitted to the jury on the issue of last clear chanc·e
as the jlll'y might have reasonably found that the

elements set forth in Section 480 of the Restatement

I

, I

of Torts and adopted by this Court were present.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it appears desirable to point out
that if the testimony most favorable to the Appellant

is considered, together with the reasonable inferences
that ean be drawn from it, the facts of this case are

such as to definitely fall within the province of the
jury to determine, and that a directed verdict based

upon these facts by the trial court constituted an

invasion of such province.

From the evidence and reasonable inferences based
thereon, the jury could find on the one hand that the
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decedent was not contributorily negligent, or, if he

was, that said negligence did not proximately contribute
to his death; and, on the other hand, the jury could find

if he was contributorily negligent that the defendant had
a last clear chance to avoid the accident.
The thesis behind the presumption of due care
and the rule of last clear chance, based as they are

upon human experience alXi a humanitarian policy, is
designed to protect against the same set of circumstances
that are extant in this ease.

And the careless action

on the part of the defendant, which the trial court
termed as gross negligence, we feel bordered upon a

wanton, reckless and criminal act.

These doctrines

were propounded to insure to the injured parties
their fundamental right to a jury determination of

the facts and issues involved.
Appellant sincerely submits that the trial court
erred in each of the rulings specified under the

points herein presented and argued.
Respectfully submitted,

BRANT H. VIALL & JAY
E.Ll\IER BANKS,
Attorneys for Appellant

-48-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

